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Abstract 
This paper assumes that ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations are the result of the dynamic 
interaction between liquidity and solvency conditions of individual economic 
units. The framework is an extention of Sordi and Vercelli (this issue) de­
signed as an heterogeneous agent model which proceeds through discrete 
time steps within a ﬁnite time horizon. The interaction at the micro-level 
between economic units monitors the spread of contagion and systemic risk, 
producing interesting complex dynamics. The model is analyzed by means of 
numerical simulations and systemic risk modelling, where local interaction of 
units is captured and analysed by the bilateral provision of liquidity among 
units. The behavior and evolution of economic units are studied for diﬀerent 
parameter regimes in order to investigate the relation between units’ expec­
tations, liquidity regimes and contagion. Liquidity policy implications are 
brieﬂy discussed. 
Keywords: Financial ﬂuctuations, Contagion, Systemic risk, 
Heterogeneous agents, Complex dynamics 
1 1. Introduction 
2 The complex dynamics of ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations reﬂects the impact of indi­
3
 vidual decisions on the macro variables of the economy within the technolog­

4 ical, ﬁnancial and institutional constraints characterizing a given economy. 
1Corresponding author, email: S.Giansante@bath.ac.uk 
Preprint submitted to Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationDecember 30, 2011 
5 Among the structural constraints the ﬁnancial conditions of economic units 
6 play a crucial role. In particular, the interaction between the liquidity and 
7 solvency conditions of economic units seems to play a crucial role in the emer­
8 gence of complex ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations. This interaction is signiﬁcant at the 
9 level of single ﬁnancial units, under suitable simplifying assumptions, to mod­
10
 elling the typical ﬂuctuations of their ﬁnancial conditions. The model may

11
 be also applied to the economy as a whole providing some general insights on

12
 its ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations and its policy implications (Sordi and Vercelli, this

13
 issue, 2006; Vercelli, 2000, 2011; Dieci et al., 2006). However, a crucial fea­

14
 ture of real ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations is missing in this approach: the interaction

15 between the units’ balance sheets that heavily aﬀects their behavior. 
16 A case in point is the so-called “contagion” that has played a crucial role 
17 in recent ﬁnancial crises and has enhanced systemic risk.2 There is a vast 
18 and growing literature on systemic risk and ﬁnancial contagion, in particular 
19
 post ﬁnancial crisis 2007-2008 (see ?Haldane (2009) for an overview). The

20
 origins of systemic risk has been modelled as a “bank run” where the loss in

21
 conﬁdence in the banking system pushes depositors to withdraw money from

22
 their banks, so triggering a contagion eﬀect (see for example De Bandt and

23
 Hartmann (2000) for an overview of diﬀerent forms od systemic risk). Alter­

24
 natively, it can occur as a consequence of an exogenous shock (see Kaufman

25 and Scott (2003); Kaufmann (2005) for a qualitative overview). 
26
 The other important component of systemic risk modelling is the descrip­

27
 tion of the spread of contagion in the system. Two main approaches have

28
 been developed in recent literature. The ﬁrst one is what it is called the “ﬁre­

29
 sale” approach, in which the propagation of contagion is driven by the losses

30
 in asset values due to liquidation of failing banks (Allen and Gale, 2001; Dia­

31
 mond and Rajan, 2005; Freixas et al., 2000). The second one directly models

32
 the bilateral ﬂows between units in a ﬁnancial network as a direct channel of

33
 contagion (see Markose et al. (this issue); Krause and Giansante (this issue);

34
 Vivier-Lirimont (2004); Iori et al. (2008); Cohen-Cole et al. (2010) for an

35 extensive literature review). 
36
 This work will address the problem of systemic risk by modelling the ori­

37 gins of contagion as a result of an endogenous liquidity shock closely related 
2According to the Bank of International Settlements, systemic risk is deﬁned as “the 
risk that the failure of a participant to meet its contractual obligations may in turn cause 
other participants to default with a chain reaction leading to broader ﬁnancial diﬃculties” 
(BIS, 1994) 
2 
38 to the “bank run” approach, in which the trigger event is driven by the eco­
39 nomic business cycle as described in Sordi and Vercelli (this issue) and the 
40 central bank liquidity policy. The losses spread along direct connections of 
41 liquidity ﬂows between units in the network of liquidity provision. 
42 The interaction between units’ balance sheets is particularly visible dur­
43 ing the most serious ﬁnancial crises but plays a crucial role in all the phases 
44 of the cycle as it reﬂects the interdependence via the ﬁnancial inﬂows and 
45 outﬂows of the economic units. Increased outﬂows of a unit translate in in­
46 creased inﬂows of other units and the other way round. In order to study this 
47 interaction we adopt an heterogeneous-agent model which proceeds through 
48 discrete time steps within a ﬁnite time horizon. Economic units decide their 
49 liquidity ﬂows on the basis of their liquidity index, solvency index and ﬁnan­
50 cial fragility parameters, deﬁned in the next Section. It is also assumed that 
51 the units can also borrow money from the Central Bank in order to meet 
52 their liquidity needs. 
53 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the approach ex­
54 plored in this paper by modelling the behavior of ﬁnancial units and their 
55 interactions with other units and the Central Bank. Section 3 presents an 
56 exercise of a stylized economy with three units interacting under diﬀerent 
57 liquidity policy regimes. Section 4 extends the previous results by modelling 
58 and simulating a larger system. Section 5 concludes. 
59 2. The Model 
60 The model proceeds through discrete time steps. A set of N economic 
61 units (each labelled by an index i = 1, . . . , N) interacts at each timestep 
62 t. Economic units encompass all kinds of private economic units including 
63 ﬁrms, banks, and households. The private units of a certain economy interact 
64 not only among themselves but also with the public economic units. We will 
65 consider only one of the public units that plays a crucial role in monetary 
66 and ﬁnancial policy: the Central Bank. 
67 2.1. Current Financial Ratios 
68 Units are heterogeneous in terms of their liquidity positions and exchange 
69 strategies. 
70 Let us deﬁne an N × N matrix X of bilateral ﬂows where the element 
71 xi,j represents the directed ﬂow between units i and j. This ﬂow is an inﬂow 
72 from the point of view of unit j and an outﬂow from the point of view of 
3 
� 
73 unit i. 
74

75

Therefore, the elements of the row i describe the outﬂows of the unit 
i, while the elements of the column j describes the inﬂows of the unit j. 
The sum of the elements of the row i equals the total outﬂow of unit i,

76
 while the sum of the elements of the column j equals the total inﬂos of unit 
77
 j. 
yj,t = xji, (1)

i

78
 and � 
ei,t = xij . (2) 
j 
79
 deﬁne the total inﬂows and outﬂows respectively. 
80
 We measure the liquidity of unit i at time t according to Sordi and Vercelli 
81
 (this issue) as the surplus of ﬁnancial inﬂows yi,t minus ﬁnancial outﬂows 
82
 ei,t, all ﬂows being measured at the same time unit. We can then deﬁne the 
83
 liquidity index for unit i at time t, fi,t, as 
fi,t = yi,t − ei,t. (3) 
84
 On the other hand, the solvency of the unit is captured by its “net worth”, 
85
 deﬁned as the discounted value of its expected surpluses and deﬁcits. We 
86
 deﬁne the solvency index for unit i at time t, f ∗ i,t, as 
Ti� Et−1[fi,t+s]
f ∗ = . (4)i,t (1 + r)s 
s=0 
87
 where Et−1[.] denotes the conditional expectation operator based upon infor­

88
 mation available at the end of period t − 1 and Ti ≥ 1 is the time horizon of

unit i. The nominal interest rate r is used as the discount factor.3
89

90
 2.2. Dynamic interaction between units’ solvency and liquidity conditions 
91
 Following Sordi and Vercelli (this issue), we obtain a feedback relation

92
 between the solvency and liquidity indices under the assumption that units

93
 forecast their future liquidity indices for the next Ti periods by using a mix

3We do not need to distinguish between nominal and real interest rates as prices are 
ﬁxed for simplicity. 
4 
� � � �

� � 
� � 
�
�
96 
103 
94 of heterogenous (extrapolative and regressive) expectations.4 In this case, 
95 from (4) we arrive at the equation 
= βer 1 − aiβer f ∗ i,tfi,t + i,tfi,t+1 (5)
i,t 
(1 + r)
�Ti [1/ (1 + r)s] = r (1 + r)Ti /s=0 Ti+1where
 ai = − 1 and where,

97 indicating by ρei and ρ
r
i the coeﬃcients of extrapolative and regressive expec­
98 tations respectively, and with b a small positive magnitude, we have: 
βer = i,t 
⎧ ⎪⎪⎨ ⎪⎪⎩

(1−ρri ) (1+r)Ti+1−(1−ρir )
Ti+1
(1+r)Ti (r+ρri ) 
, if |fi,t − aiµi| > b 
(1+ρei ) (1+r)
Ti+1−(1+ρei )
Ti+1
(1+r)Ti (r−ρei ) 
, if |fi,t − aiµi| < b 
(6)

In this deﬁnition of the parameter βer , the crucial role is played by µ that99 i,t
100 represents a safe liquidity margin that units do not want to bridge, i.e. the 
101 minimum value of its net worth suﬃciently higher than zero, beneath which 
102 units do not want to go. 
fi,t+1 
104 target that unit i aims to achieve at t + 1. It is described by the dynamic 
105 equation 
fi,t+1 
Then, we deﬁne here the desired liquidity index
 the liquidity
as

= fi,t − α(f ∗ i,t − µi). (7)

106
 Following Sordi and Vercelli (this issue), when a unit at time t is aware that

107
 the value of its solvency index is greater than the safety margin µi, it reacts

108
 (in the next period) by reducing outﬂows relative to inﬂows and vice versa

109 when the value of its index is less than µi. 
110
 The intended contribution of this paper is the description and imple­

111
 mentation of the micro-interactions between units that originate from their

112
 attempts to meet their individual liquidity targets. As a preliminary step,

113 the latter are described and discussed in the next section. 
114 2.3. Liquidity targets 
115 At each time step, units compute their liquidity index fi,t (3) and their 
116 solvency index f ∗ Dependingi,t (4) on the basis of the bilateral matrix ﬂow Xt. 
117 on the value of their solvency index, units may decide to increase or decrease 
4We emphasize that liquidity indices f are realized values while the solvencies indices 
f∗ are expected values. 
5 
118 their current liquidity index by modifying the level of inﬂows and outﬂows. 
119 One way to do so is to negotiate new monetary ﬂows with other units with 
120 opposite liquidity needs. In order to diﬀerentiate units by their liquidity 
121 needs, we deﬁne here the absolute deviation z of the liquidity index fi,t from 
122 the next period liquidity target f�i,t+1 as follows: 
zi,t = f�i,t+1 − fi,t, (8) 
123 The value of z captures the absolute change of the current liquidity index 
124 to meet the outﬂows targets for the next period (captured by f�). In other 
125 words, the sign of z allows us to diﬀerentiate between units with a positive 
126 and a negative liquidity gradient (i.e. units that want to increase or decrease 
127 their liquidity index respectively). 
128 It is clear that new liquidity negotiation can only occur between units 
129 with opposite signs of z. The next section presents a matching mechanism 
130 of bilateral liquidity ﬂows adjustment according to each liquidity target. 
131 2.4. Matching mechanism 
132 In principle there is an inﬁnite number of ways to adjust ei,t+1 and yi,t+1 
133 that satisfy f�i,t+1. In particular, the deviation z is used as a proxy for the 
134 gradient of liquidity that the unit aims to achieve. A positive value of z 
135 describes an economic unit wishing to increase the liquidity index for the 
136 next period, while a negative value of z describes an economic unit wishing 
137 to reduce the liquidity index. Both positive and negative changes can be 
138 easily achieved by modifying the outﬂows or inﬂows according to the rules of 
139 the matching mechanism. We model a mechanism that matches units with 
140 opposite directional changes5 . 
141 We deﬁne two new variables τi,t
y and τi,t
e as percentage change in y and e, 
142 consistent with f� as 
5The same results may be achieved by decreasing inﬂows (for negative z) or outﬂows (for 
positive z). However, this second option would require renegotiation procedures between 
parties about previous deals with penalties to be paid from the party who decides to 
withdraw from a contract. As we are only interested in the evolution of the indices (not 
inﬂow and/or outﬂows separately), the incremental mechanism is the easiest solution at 
this stage. 
6 
� 
� 
� � �� 
� � 
zi,t 
τ y = yi,t 
if zi,t > 0, 
(9)i,t 
0 otherwise. 
|zi,t| if zi,t < 0, 
τ e = ei,t (10)i,t 
0 otherwise. 
As we can see in (9) and (10), τ y takes only positive values of zi,t, relative 143 i,t 
144 to the amount of inﬂow of the unit. It represents the percentage change of 
inﬂow needed to reach a positive change in liquidity. On the other side, τ e 145 i,t 
146 takes only negative values of zi,t (in absolute terms) relative to the amount 
147 of outﬂows the unit has to increase in order to decrease its liquidity index 
148 (as z is negative). In other words, we use τ y and τ e to split our population of 
149 economic units into two groups on the basis of the liquidity gradient. There­
150 fore, the two populations will try to achieve diﬀerent investment decisions, 
151 either by increasing inﬂows (τ y) or by increasing outﬂows (τ e). 
152 The evolution of each bilateral ﬂow xij is computed according to 
xij,t+1 = 1 + min τ
y , τ e xij,t.. (11)j,t i,t 
153 Equation (11) describes a dynamic update of bilateral ﬂows that takes 
154 into account the strategies of units i and j for next period. Remember 
155 that the ﬂow xij is an outﬂow for i and an inﬂow for j. In the case of 
156 a matching both parties i and j agree to increase the ﬂow xij , which can 
157 only accomodate the minimum of the two. Therefore, the min function in 
equation (11) applied to τ e and τ y (representing the percentage increase 158 i,t j,t 
159 of the ﬂow xij that agents i and j would like to achieve for next period 
160 respectively), prevents an overincrease of xij that would be above the limit 
161 of one of the two parties. 
162 2.5. Central bank liquidity policy 
163 Business cycle ﬂuctuations directly aﬀect the success of units in meet­
164 ing their liquidity needs. However, the intervention of the Central Bank as 
165 lender/borrower of last resort can help units to fulﬁll their liquidity goals by 
166 fully or partially oﬀsetting the units’ position not covered by the other units. 
167 We deﬁne the central bank intervention Ci,t for unit i for next time period 
168 t + 1 as 
= λC � , 0 ≤ λC (12)Ci,t+1 t+1 fi,t+1 − fi,t+1 t+1 ≤ 1 
7 
169 where λCt+1 is the percentage support the central bank is willing to grant at 
170 time t + 1. The higher the percentage, the bigger the support of the central 
171 bank to the unit. A positive value of the central bank intervention Ci,t+1 
172 identiﬁes a lending operation to the unit, while a negative value identiﬁes a 
173 borrowing operation of the central bank from the unit. 
174 We deﬁne the maximum liquidity buﬀer the central bank is willing to 
175 grant to units in each time t as Lt. It describes the maximum net intervention 
176 of the central bank in the market at time t. In other words, banks can borrow 
177 money from the central bank up to Lt, ∀t = 1, . . . , S where S represents 
178 the number of time periods of the entire system. We expect that liquidity 
179 needs from the economic units up to Lt are fully covered by the central 
180 bank, while higher needs can only be partially covered up to Lt. A ﬁrst 
181 attempt of liquidity need redistribution we implements here is by describing 
182 the dynamics of λCt+1 as follows 
⎧ � � � ⎨1 if f�i,t+1 − fi,t+1 ≤ Lt+1, 
λCt+1 = Lt+1 
i,t+1 
(13)⎩� otherwise. 
i,t+1[f�i,t+1−fi,t+1] 
183 Values of Lt+1 in (13) greater than the sum of all liquidity needs from the 
184 units (after the matching mechanism) means that the central bank is willing 
185 to oﬀer enough liquidity buﬀer to satisfy the entire system. Therefore, the 
186 value of λCt+1 will be equal to 1, meaning that the central bank will give 100% 
187 support to the units in reaching their liquidity targets. However, values of 
188 Lt+1 below the liquidity need of the market represents a situation in which 
189 the central bank does not have enough liquitity to fully support the units. 
190 In that case, λCt+1 will be set up as the ratio between Lt+1 and the overall 
191 liquidity need, that is the partial support that the central bank is able to 
192 provide (λCt+1 < 1).
6 
193 Finally, we can easily write the equation describing the dynamics of the 
194 liquidity index as 
fi,t+1 = yi,t+1 − ei,t+1 + Ci,t+1. (14) 
195 where, as we know from (12), the value of Ci,t+1 also depends on the Central 
196 Bank support. 
6Note that the adjustment of λCt+1 assures a proportional distribution of liquidity to 
the units relative to the amount requested. 
8 
209 
210 
197 The following example shows a numerical exercise that implements the 
198 matching mechanism introduced above. 
199 Example 
200 Assume that the bilater matrix X0 of an economic system with three 
201 units is given by ⎡ ⎤ 
0 0.5 0.3 
X0 = ⎣ 0.4 0 0.3 ⎦ 
0.5 0.4 0 
202 from which units computes their outﬂows e0 = [0.8 0.7 0.9]
� and inﬂows 
203 y0 = [0.9 0.9 0.6]. Assuming no central bank intervention at time t = 0, 
204 the vector of the liquidity index at this time f0 will be ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ 
0.9 0.8 0 0.1 
f0 = y0 − e0 + C0 = ⎣ 0.9 ⎦ ⎣ 0.7 ⎦ + ⎣ 0 ⎦ = ⎣ 0.2 ⎦−
0.6 0.9 0 −0.3 
205 According to equation (4)7, the solvency index of next time period will be 
206 f ∗ = [0.16 0.29 − 0.35]� and therefore the desired liquidity index for next 1

8

207 period will be f�1 = [0.15 0.25 − 0.24]�. 
208 The matching mechanism will split the units into those willing to either 
y 
1 on the basis
increase y or e by computing the percentage changes τ

e 
1 and τ

of the directional change z1: ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ 
0.052 0 0.058 ⎦ τ ⎦ τ
0.052 0 0.087 
211
 The values of z clearly show that all units want to increase their liquidity

212 index as all z entries are positive. Therefore, the only way for the units 
213 to increase their inﬂows is to borrow liquidity from the central bank. If 
we assume full support with unlimited liquidity from the central bank, 214 a 
⎣ 0.052
 ⎣ 0
 ⎣ 0.058 ⎦
e yz1 = =
 =
1 1 
by setting λ
Ci =
 1, ∀i = 1, 2, 3, then C1 = [0.052 0.052 0.052]�. Here the

216 public intervention allows units to fulﬁll their liquidity needs and realize their 
217 desired liquidity index, that is f1 = f�1 = [0.15 0.25 − 0.24]�. 
7We use f∗ = [0.1 0.1 0.1]�, ρ = 0.3, r = 0.05, µi = 0.2 ∀i = 1, 2, 3 and T = 1 0 
8Values have been rounded to 2 decimal places 
9 
215 
218 2.6. Bankruptcy 
219 The last component of the model is a criterion for unit bankruptcy. For 
220 the purpose of this exercise, we will focus on situations of liquidity deﬁcit that 
221 may lead to bankruptcy, meaning an prolonged period of negative liquidity 
222 issue that make the unit insolvent. Therefore, an economic unit is declared 
223 bankrupt if its liquidity index is negative for more than b consecutive time 
224 steps. The number of time steps b is then the length of time window that 
225 units have to raise liquidity from the market to avoid bankruptcy. When a 
226 unit is declared bankrupt, all ﬂows from and to the bankrupt unit are set to 
227 zero. 
228 3. A three units example 
229 This section presents the results of a three unit exercise that is based 
230 on the example presented in the previous section. We set b = 5, which 
231 means that units with negative liquidity indices will have to raise liquidity in 
232 not more than 5 time steps to avoid bankruptcy. We set up three diﬀerent 
233 liquidity policy scenarios to underline policy implications of market stabil­
234 ity. For simplicity, we will consider a constant liquidity policy over time, 
235 that is Lt = L, ∀t = 1, . . . , S. We do not apply any liquidity constraint 
236 and bankruptcy criterion in the ﬁrst 100 time steps to allow the market to 
237 converge to a stable business cycle. 
238 3.1. Scenario 1: Complete Central Bank Intervention (L →∞) 
239 The ﬁrst scenario we present describes an environment with an liquidity 
240 buﬀer that approaches to inﬁnity held by the central bank at every step. 
241 This means that units can always meet their liquidity needs by borrowing 
242 money from the central bank if the market cannot provide enough liquidity. 
243 As L approaches inﬁnity, λC will converge to 1 ∀t = 1, . . . , S which means t 
244 that the central bank will always meet the units’ need for liquidity in the case 
245 when funds cannot be raised from the market. Figure 1 pictures ﬂuctuations 
246 of liquidity and solvecy indices for each unit. On the left hand side, we plot 
247 the time series of the liquidity index fi (red) and solvency index fi 
∗ for each 
248 unit i = 1, 2, 3, while on the right hand side we show all combination points 
249 of liquidity and solvency indices of each unit. 
250 This scenario represents the business cycle base line for comparison with 
251 the other two scenarios (Sordi and Vercelli, this issue). 
10 
Figure 1: Scenario 1: time series of liquidity (red line) and solvency (blue line) indices for 
each unit on the left hand side; phase plot of solvency/liquidity indices on the right hand 
side 
11

Figure 2: Scenario 2: liquidity deﬁcit (in percentage) of the system as the result of the 
Central Bank liquidity policy L. 
252 3.2. Scenario 2: Contagion and Counterparty Risk (L = 0.1) 
253 The second scenario describes an environment with a limited liquidity 
254 buﬀer held by the central bank, which is set at Lt = 0.1, ∀t = 1, . . . , S. 
255 When the market shows an excess of liquidity demand, the central bank can 
256 only supply the market with a maximum amount of L. This will produce a 
257 lack of liquidity in the system. 
258 Figure 2 shows nine cases with lack of liquidity, meaning that λC < 1 from 
259 equation (13). The value 1 − λC can be interpreted as percentage liquidity 
260 deﬁcit in the market as a result of the central bank liquidity policy. Note 
261 that three major peaks of liquidity lacking greater than 20% at time 109, 
262 123 and 134 respectively can be observed, with an average of 13.6% across 
263 all events. The impact of this liquidity policy is pictured in Figure 3, where 
264 The 22% liquidity deﬁcit faced by the units at time 134 caused unit 3 to 
265 go bankrupt, which occurs at time 139. Unit 3 was the only unit facing a 
12 
Figure 3: Scenario 2: time series of liquidity (red line) and solvency (blue line) indices for 
each unit on the left hand side; phase plot of solvency/liquidity indices on the right hand 
side 
13

266 negative liquidity index at the time of the event (time 134). The default of 
267 unit 3 spreads to the other units as counterparty risk. Unit 2 had a positive 
268 exposure to unit 3, that is outﬂows to unit 3 greater than inﬂows from unit 
269 3 (x2,3 > x3,2); this event triggered a positive jumps in the unit 2 liquidity 
270 index as it faced a net loss in its outﬂows. Unit 1 had an opposite eﬀect 
271 as it was negatively exposed to unit 3. This bankruptcy event pushed unit 
272 1 to more exposed positions as a result of a negative jump its its liquidity 
273 index. However, unit 1 was able to raise liquidity within 5 time steps and 
274 avoid bankruptcy. 
275 The last scenario, with a more rigid monetary policy, will describe a 
276 diﬀerent outcome for this unit. 
277 3.3. Scenario 3: Contagion and Systemic Risk (L = 0.08) 
278 In the last scenario we reduce further the maximum liquidity buﬀer L to 
279 0.08. 
280 As shown in Figure 4, the lack of systemic liquidity is more substantial 
281 than in the previous scenario (average loss of 19.2%). The last and biggest 
282 lack in liquidity the units faced at time 131 (32% loss) pushed unit 3 to 
283 bankruptcy at time 135. Consequently, the negative exposure of unit 1 to 
284 unit 3 results in a downward jump of its liquidity index that dictated its 
285 bankruptcy at time 140 (see Figure 5). 
286 With two units bankrupt out of three, the entire market collapses. The 
287 very restrictive liquidity policy tested in this scenario eventually triggers a 
288 domino eﬀect that results in the collapse of the system. 
289 4. Simulation results: endogenous ﬂuctuations and bankruptcy 
290 In this section we extend the three unit example by having a large eco­
291 nomic system, with number of units N = 100. Our aim is to understand the 
292 implications of one aspect of the monetary policy strategies, that is the the 
293 impact of the systemic liquidity constraint L, to the spread of contagion and 
294 systemic risk. 
295 The initialization of the parameters related to the units behavior are the 
296 following9: µ = 0.2, b = 0.02, ρe = 0.2, ρr = 0.08, α = 0.25. 
9The magnitude of the parameters have been chosed according to the simulation ex­
periments presented in Sordi and Vercelli (this issue). 
14 
Figure 4: Scenario 3: liquidity deﬁcit (in percentage) of the system as the result of the 
Central Bank liquidity policy L. 
15

Figure 5: Scenario 3: time series of liquidity (red line) and solvency (blue line) indices for 
each unit on the left hand side; phase plot of solvency/liquidity indices on the right hand 
side 
16

297 Units are allowed to interact, that is to transfer monetary ﬂows, to any 
298 other unit in the market at zero transaction or search costs. Therefore, any 
299 economic unit can have up to N − 1 counterparties in each time step10 . 
300 We initialize the matrix X of bilateral ﬂows in a random fashion and we 
301 test the model under diﬀerent values of L, r and T . 
302 4.1. Determinants of contagion at the system level 
303 First of all, we report the number of bankrupt units under diﬀerent liq­
304 uidity policy regimes. To compare the system with a diﬀerent number of 
305 units, we deﬁne L� = L/N as the average amount of liquidity the central 
306 bank is willing to provide for each unit. Note that L� varies in the range 
307 [0, 0.1], which means that the max liquidity buﬀer the central bank can use 
308 to satisfy unit liquidity needs is �LxN . 
309 Figure 6 shows the eﬀect of strict liquidity policy regimes to the number 
310 of bankrupt units due to systemic risk. Indeed, the lower the level of the 
311 liquidity buﬀer L, the larger the number of bankrupt units, up to the extreme 
312 case with zero liquidity buﬀer and the complete collapse of the system. The 
313 direct eﬀect of the liquidity regime on unit behavior is captured by the unit 
314 expectation index, representing the percentage number of times the units 
315 adopt extrapolative expectation instead of regressive ones. As we can see in 
316 Figure 6, larger liquidity buﬀers drive the units to more exposed positions, 
317 by using more extrapolative expectations than regressive ones. However, 
318 the transition from lower to higher levels of L does not necessarily means 
319 a monotonic transition from a lower to a higher expectation index value. 
320 What appears to be very interesting is the transition, which is not linear 
321 as we would have expected to see. Indeed, by constantly reducing liquidity 
322 provision L, the number of defaulting units ﬁrst increases, then decreases to 
323 increase again in the proximity of L = 0 (the case with T = 4 in Figure 6). 
324 Sordi and Vercelli (this issue) discussed the eﬀect of higher values of T , 
325 that is the discrete time window of units solvency conditions forecast, on the 
326 ﬂuctuations of the liquidity index. Indeed, higher values of T amplify the 
327 ﬂuctuations of the individual liquidity index, making the unit more exposed 
328 to liquidity distress. This can be observed in Figure 6 with T = 4. As 
10An interesting extension to the model would be to limit the number of counterparties 
each unit can have. That would allow us to study the contribution of the speciﬁc topology 
of the network ﬂows among economic units to the spread of contagion. As this analysis is 
beyond the scope of this paper, we will leave it to future work. 
17 
Figure 6: Scatter plots of the number of bankrupt units (blue dots) and the the expectation 
index (green dots) relative to the monetary policy buﬀer L of the system, under diﬀerent 
values of T . 
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329
 units take more exposed positions, they end up using regressive expectations

330
 even with high levels of L (no lack of liquidity due to limited amount of

331
 L) just because of their strategy. In this scenario, units seem to have an

332
 altered perception of the liquidity policy in operation by the central bank

333
 that causes the adoption of extrapolative expectations even with very tight

334
 liquidity regimes. The outcome of this altered behavior is a jump in the

335
 number of bankrupt units that were not able to realize in time how exposed

336
 their position was. They should have recovered very quickly their loss by

337
 using regressive expectations. However, the altered perception of market

338
 conditions described above does not allow the units to realise their dangerous

339 situation, so increasing their chances of bankruptcy. 
340 4.2. Determinants of contagion at the individual level 
341 We are conﬁdent that the approach suggested above may help us to un­
342
 derstand the individual determinants of bankruptcy of economic units. A

343
 preliminary step in this direction is to record the level of liquidity and sol­

344
 vency indices of each bankrupt unit at the time they are aﬀected by either a

345
 lack of liquidity due to the liquidity regime of the central bank or the default

346 of one or more counterparties. 
347
 Figure 7 plots the combinations of liquidity and solvency values of all

348
 bankrupt units when they ﬁrst were aﬀected by the loss in liquidity (either

349
 from the central bank or the counterparty). These plots give us information

350
 about the fragility of units along the business cycle. Units are particularly

351
 vulnerable to contagion when they have a negative liquidity index. However,

352
 the majority of the most exposed points in our simulations is concentrated

353
 in the area with positive solvency values around the value µ. In other words,

354
 the majority of units that went bankrupt because of contagion are the ones

355
 that at the time of the contagion had a negative liquidity index and positive

356
 solvency index. A tentative interpretation of this prima facie surprising re­

357
 sult may be that units with a positive solvency react to a worsening of their

358
 liquidity index induced by contagion with insuﬃcient energy being reassured

359
 by an insolvency index that they still believe to be fairly safe. However the

360
 solvency index depends on expectations that deteriorate very rapidly in a

361
 period of ﬁnancial crisis characterized by contagion. In such a situation a

362
 positive net worth may very rapidly become negative determining the insol­

363
 vency of the economic unit. Finally, another result of our simulations is that

364 higher values of T increase the ﬂuctuations of the liquidity and solvency in­
365 dices and then amplify the variability of the marginal distribution of the two 
19 
Figure 7: Scatter plot of the combination of liquidity and solvency values of bankrupt units 
at the time of the contagion. The bar plots at the side and below refer to the marginal 
histograms of the distribution of the liquidity and solvency values respectively. 
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366 indices. This result is not surprising since a longer time horizon ampliﬁes 
367 more the eﬀects of a change of expectations contributing to the strength of 
368 ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations. 
369 This phenomenon increases their chance of going bankrupt and explains 
370 the concentration of the points plotted in Figure 7 around the value of µ. 
371 Higher values of T increases the ﬂuctuation of the liquidity and solvency 
372 indices and then amplify the variability of the marginal distribution of the 
373 two indices. 
374 5. Concluding remarks 
375 This work has aimed at a preliminary investigation of the interaction 
376 between liquidity and solvency conditions within systemic risk framework. 
377 Previous research by the authors has shown that this interaction contributes 
378 to the explanation of ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations for single economic units or for an 
379 agent representative of the entire economy. The aggregate approach of these 
380 contributions, however, clouds some crucial features of ﬁnancial ﬂuctuations, 
381 such as contagion, that critically depend on the complementarity between 
382 the balance sheets of economic units. This relation brings about a second 
383 order interaction between liquidity and solvency conditions at the level of 
384 the entire economy that depends on their interaction at the units level. This 
385 increases the degree of complexity of the economic dynamics that character­
386 izes a ﬁnancialized economy. The simulations performed in the second part 
387 of the paper suggest preliminary results on how ﬁnancial contagion is trans­
388 mitted throughout the economy and clarify under which ﬁnancial conditions 
389 the units are more likely to be aﬀected. The complex dynamics of this model 
390 economy increases the ﬁnancial fragility of the illiquid economic units even 
391 if their solvency index looks satisfactory in the light of current expectations. 
392 However, the signiﬁcance of the results of the current model is limited by 
393 a series of simplifying assumptions that we aim to relax in future works. In 
394 particular, we refer to the homogeneity of economic units reaction funtions 
395 which follows from setting, as we have done in basic dynamic equations as (7) 
396 and (12), the parameters equal across all units.As for policy implications, a 
397 more comprehensive analysis requires the introduction of public expenditure. 
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